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Abstract
In the paper we introduce a weak set theory H<ω. A formalization of arith-
metic on finite von Neumann ordinals gives an embedding of arithmetical lan-
guage into this theory. We show that H<ω proves a natural arithmetization of
its own Hilbert-style consistency. Unlike some previous examples of theories
proving their own consistency, H<ω appears to be sufficiently natural.
The theory H<ω is infinitely axiomatizable and proves existence of all in-
dividual hereditarily finite sets, but at the same time all its finite subtheories
have finite models. Therefore, our example avoids the strong version of Go¨del’s
second incompleteness theorem (due to Pudla´k) that asserts that no consistent
theory interpreting Robinson’s arithmetic Q proves its own consistency [11]. To
show that H<ω proves its own consistency we establish a conservation result
connecting Kalmar elementary arithmetic EA and H<ω.
We also consider the version of H<ω over higher order logic denoted H
ω
<ω. It
has the same “non-Go¨delian” property as H<ω but happens to be more attractive
from a technical point of view. In particular, we show that Hω<ω proves a Π1
sentence ϕ of the predicate-only version of arithmetical language iff EA proves
that ϕ holds on the superexponential cut.
1 Introduction
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems are among the most outstanding results in mathe-
matical logic. The present paper is about the limits of applicability of Go¨del’s second
incompleteness theorem (G2). The standard non-precise formulation of G2 is that
no strong enough formal system could prove its own consistency. However in order
to make this formulation a mathematical theorem it is necessary to specify exact
mathematical meaning to the terms used in it.
Kurt Go¨del in [4] has considered theories that extend the system P (a variant
of Principia Mathematica system) by primitive recursive sets of axioms. He have
developed certain formalization of the consistency assertion for theories of this class
within the language of system P. And has proved that no consistent theory from
this class could prove the formalization of its own consistency. Here it is important
to note that although Go¨del used higher-order system P, he have not relied on the
higher-order features of system P and essentially the same construction would work
with first-order arithmetic PA as the base system.
Further we will discussing more general forms of G2 and examples of theories for
which it fails. Our focus will be in generalizations that still talk about unprovability of
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formalized (in some sense) consistency assertion. There are generalizations of G2 that
does not fall into this category but rather are formulated in terms of interpretability
[2, 15].
One approach to define what is a formalized consistency assertion for a theory T is
just to fix some canonical way of producing sentences Con(T ) from an axiomatization
of T . Typically this is done in the language of first arithmetic1. This allows to
ask whether a theory T proves Con(T ), provided that there is a fixed embedding
of arithmetical language into the language of T . In the present paper we give an
examples of theories that prove their own consistency in this sense.
The other approach is to consider some axiomatic conditions on what constitute a
suitable formalization of the consistency assertion. The generalization of G2 developed
by David Hilbert and Paul Bernays [6] was based on the conditions on the formalized
proof predicate, i.e. a predicate PrfT (x, y) which intended meaning is that x is a
code of T -proof of formula with Go¨del number y. Latter the approach was simplified
by Martin Hugo Lo¨b [8], who instead has formulated what is now known as Hilbert-
Bernays-Lo¨b derivability conditions (HBL conditions) on predicate PrvT (x):
1. T ⊢ ϕ ⇒ T ⊢ PrvT (pϕq), for all sentences ϕ;
2. T ⊢ PrvT (pϕ→ ψq)→ (PrvT (pϕq)→ PrvT (pψq)), for all sentences ϕ, ψ;
3. T ⊢ PrvT (pϕq)→ PrvT (pPrvT (pϕq)q), for all sentences ϕ.
The intended meaning of PrvT (x) is that formula with Go¨del number x is prov-
able in T . By a standard technique, it is possible to prove that if T is a consis-
tent extension of Robinson’s arithmetic Q (PA without induction) and PrvT (x) satis-
fies HBL-conditions, then T does not prove the corresponding consistency assertion
¬PrvT (p0 = 1q) (see Petr Ha´jek and Pavel Pudla´k book [5, Theorem III.2.21]). In
fact, in addition to HBL-conditions, the proof of the result only uses first-order rea-
soning in T and existence of sentence ϕ such that T ⊢ ϕ↔ ¬ϕ (which is produced
by Diagonal Lemma). Since even weaker Robinson’s arithmetic R proves Diagonal
Lemma [13, Theorem 3] the argument works for its extensions as well (see Appendix
A for definition of R). There are very general results about unprovability of con-
sistency under HBL-conditions and either presence of formalization of syntax (by
Robert Jeroslow [7]) or presence of the appropriate fixed points (by Lev Beklemishev
and Daniyar Shamkanov [1]). Beklemishev and Shamkanov [1] provided an example
of a system based on a certain contraction-free logic (instead of usually used classical
or intuitonistic logic), where their abstract version of G2 fails.
Further we will focus on provability/unprovability of natural formalizations of
the consistency assertion rather than formalizations arising from arbitrary predicates
satisfying HBL-conditions. Solomon Feferman [2] fixed an arithmetization of (Hilbert-
style) provability in first-order logic. This allowed him to produce formalized consis-
tency assertion Con(T ) given formula AxT (x) defining the set of axiom of T ; further,
for naturally chosen formula AxT (x) we will call the sentente Con(T ) the Hilbert-style
consistency of T . Strong enough consistent c.e. theories are capable to show that
their Hilbert-style provability predicate satisfies HBL conditions and thus they could
not prove their own Hilbert-style consistency. In [2] Feferman considered extensions
of PA, but it works even for c.e. extensions of much weaker system EA+ BΣ1.
1We note that the usage of first-order arithmetical language here is primarily due to the fact
that it is the standard approach in the field and in principle it is possible to formalize consistency
statement in any other first-order language of the same of higher expressive power, e.g. binary strings
with concatenation, set-theory.
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Although HBL conditions do not necessary hold in the case of some weaker arith-
metical c.e. theories, in many cases it is still possible to establish unprovability of
Hilbert-style consistency for them. Namely Pudla´k [11] proved that any consistent
c.e. arithmetical theory extending Robinson’s arithmetic Q could not prove its own
Hilbert-style consistency statement. The essential part of the Pudla´k’s argument was
to show that a failure of G2 for a theory T , where HBL conditions might not be
satisfied, leads to a failure of G2 in a different theory T ′ (interpretable in T ), where
HBL are satisfied.
However, here it is crucial that one considers c.e. axiomatization of a theory. As it
have been already observed by Feferman [2], for certain non-Σ1 formula defining the
set of axioms of PA the theory PA could prove the respective consistency statement.
Another interesting example of similar sort have been provided by Karl-Georg Nieber-
gall [9] who showed that the theory (PA + RFN(PA)) ∩ (PA + all true Π1 sentences)
could prove its own natural consistency sentence.
Pudla´k’s result mentioned above could be generalize further to arithmetical the-
ories in predicate-only signature that could prove totality of successor function (the
totality of successor function is important since it is necessary for the cut-shortening
technique employed by Pudla´k). However, Dan Willard has constructed examples of
c.e. arithmetical theories that could not prove the totality of successor function but
could prove their own Hilbert-style consistency [18, 19]. The theories in his examples
are not completely natural in the sense that some of axioms are constructed using
Diagonal Lemma. The main result of the present paper is the construction of a more
natural example of this kind.
We define a theory H<ω and show that it proves its own Hilbert-style consistency.
The language of system Hω set theory with additional unary function V.
First we define a weaker system H with the following axioms.
1. x = y ↔ ∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y) (Extensionality);
2. ∃y∀z(z ∈ y ↔ z ∈ x∧ϕ(z)), where ϕ(z) ranges over first-order formulas without
free occurrences of y (Separation);
3. y ∈ V(x)↔ (∃z ∈ x)(y ⊆ V(z)) (Defining axiom for V).
Here the function V is intended to be the function that maps a set x to the least level
Vα of von Neumann hierarchy such that x ⊆ Vα; note that the defining axiom for V
essentially states that V satisfies the following recursive definition:
V(x) =
⋃
y∈x
P(V(y)).
And the theory H<ω is defined to be the extension of H by all the axioms ∃x Nmbn(x)
stating the existence of all individual finite von Neumann ordinals n.
The theory H is an incomplete first-order theory which intended models are ar-
bitrary levels of von Neumann hierarchy (Vα,∈,V). To motivate this let us look at
the second-order version H2 of the system H (H2 is H with the scheme of separation
extended to the second-order language). It is easy to show that models of H2 with
the standard second-order part are up to isomorphism the models (Vα,∈,V). And
the additional axioms of H<ω rule out the finite levels of von-Neumann hierarchy as
potential models leaving only the models that contain all the individual finite sets.
Theory H is capable of formalization of ordinal arithmetic in a relatively standard
manner. Important restriction here is that both H and H<ω could not prove totality of
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successor function. The restriction of the ordinal arithmetic to the finite ordinals gives
an interpretation of predicate version of arithmetical language in H. Observe that H
could meaningfully talk about Π1 sentences of predicate-only version of arithmetical
language (we denote this class as Πpred1 ). In a standard manner we transform the
usual Hilbert-style consistency sentence Con(T ) (that is Π1 is standard arithmetical
language) to a predicate-only Πpred1 sentence Con
pred(T ). Our main result is that the
theory H<ω (and actually even H) proves Con
pred(H<ω). We note that our result is
fairly robust with respect to the choice of the particular arithmetization of the notion
of proof, which determines the exact form of the sentence Conpred(T ) (see discussion
in the beginning of Section 4).
For technical reasons it happens to be easier to establish the analogous result for
the higher-order version Hω of the system H. Actually the system Hω allows for more
natural reasoning than H. Both H and Hω are consistent with the situation when
there is the maximal well-founded rank α0 of sets. And when one reasons about the
sets which rank is close to α0 in H there might be sever restrictions on the type of
set-theoretic construction it is possible to perform with the set. For example, there
could be sets x, y such that their Cartesian product does not exist. Within the system
Hω this kind of problems could be addressed; for example, even if for two sets x, y
their Cartesian product is not a set, still x× y could be represented by a higher order
object. Thus we find Hω<ω to be even more interesting example of non-Go¨delian theory
than H<ω itself. Since the case of theory H
ω is technically simpler, we first study it
is Section 2–4. And consider the case of the theory H only latter in Section 5.
Now we give a general idea of how to prove Hilbert-style consistency of Hω<ω in H
ω.
Although it is possible to give a direct proof of consistency of Hω<ω in H
ω, in the paper
we obtain the result by proving suitable conservativity theorems. Our main technical
result is Lemma 3.11: Hω proves a Πpred1 sentence ϕ iff EA proves ϕ
S . Here ϕS is the
relativization of ϕ to the superexponential cut S that consists of all natural numbers
x for which the superexponentiation 20x is defined; by definition we put 2
y
0 = y and
2yx+1 = 2
2yx . From Lemma 3.11 it follows that in order to prove Conpred(Hω<ω) in H
ω it
is enough to prove in EA that for any Go¨del number p of a Hω<ω-proof, if 2
0
p is defined
then p could not be a proof of contradiction in Hω<ω. To prove the latter inside EA we
construct a finite model M of the size ≤ 20p that satisfy all the axioms of H
ω
<ω that
occur in p.
To prove the mentioned conservation result between Hω and EA (Lemma 3.11),
we introduce a theory EAset that is a theory in the language with the predicate ∈,
unary function P , and unary function V.
On one hand, we prove that that the theory Hω proves the same Πset1 (V) set-
theoretic sentences about hereditarily finite sets as the theory EAset. On the other
hand, we show that there is a natural bi-interpretation between EA and EAset. The
bi-interpretation is formed by the cardinal arithmetic interpretation of EA in EAset
together with the interpretation of EAset in EA by Ackermann’s membership predicate
(see Section 3.3). Additionally we show that under this bi-interpretation the ordinal
arithmetic in the theory EAset correspond to the arithmetic on numbers from super-
exponential cut in EA. Combination of this three facts allows us to prove Lemma
3.11.
We note that bi-interpretability between EA and EAset is a modified version of a
result by Richard Pettigrew [10], who have introduced a set theory EA⋆ and proved
that it is bi-interpretable with EA (see Section 3 for more extensive discussion).
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2 Theories Hω and Hω<ω
2.1 Higher order logic
We start with the description of the version of higher order logic that we use for the
theories Hω and Hω<ω.
Types are indexed by natural numbers. The type 0 is the type of individual
objects and the type n + 1 is the type of sets of the objects of the type n. We
have quantifiers over objects of any type. We allow comprehension over arbitrary
properties expressible in higher order logic.
Formally, we define the deductive system for higher order logic on top of deductive
system for many sorted first-order logic with equality, where types are indexed by
natural numbers. We have membership predicates x(n) ε y(n+1) between object x(n)
of the type n and object y(n+1) of the type n + 1. As additional principles we have
extensionality axioms
∀z(n) (z(n) ε x(n+1) ↔ z(n) ε y(n+1))→ x(n+1) = y(n+1)
and comprehension schemes
∃x(n+1)∀y(n) (y(n) ε x(n+1) ↔ ϕ(y(n))),
where ϕ is any higher order formula without free occurrences of x(n+1).
We could develop some standard constructions in the higher order logic. First let
us define representations for ordered pairs 〈x(n), y(m)〉. A pair 〈x(n), y(n)〉 is encoded
by the set {{x(n)}, {x(n), y(n)}} of the type n+2. For m < n the pairs 〈x(n), y(m)〉 are
encoded by the pairs 〈x(n), {. . . {︸ ︷︷ ︸ y
(m) } . . .}︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−m times nested
〉. And form > n the pairs 〈x(n), y(m)〉 are
encoded by the pairs 〈 {. . . {︸ ︷︷ ︸x
(n) } . . .}︸ ︷︷ ︸
m − n times nested
, y(m)〉. For sets X(n+1) and Y (m+1) we denote
as X(n+1) × Y (m+1) their Cartesian product {〈x(n), y(m)〉 | x(n) ∈ X(n+1), y(m) ∈
Y (m+1)}. We encode a function f : X(n+1) → Y (m+1) by its graph, i.e. by the set of
pairs
{〈x(n), y(m)〉 | x(n) ε X(n+1) and y(m) = f(x(n))}.
In the same way we could encode partial functions. For a set x(n) we denote by
P(x(n)) the type n+ 1 set that consists of all the sets y(n) that are subsets of x(n).
2.2 Theories Hω and Hω<ω
Theories Hω and Hω<ω are formulated over higher order logic with the only non-logical
symbols being membership predicate x(0) ∈ y(0) and function V(x(0)) with the values
of the type 0.
We use some additional naming convention. We call objects of the type 0 sets
and use small Latin letters x, y, z, . . . for variables over sets. We call object of type n
type n sets. Also we call type 1 sets classes and use capital Latin letters X,Y, Z, . . .
without upper indexes for variables that range over classes. We denote the class of
all sets as V. We use ⊆ as the standard shorthand both for sets of type 0 and of
higher types: the expression x ⊆ y is the shorthand for ∀z (z ∈ x → z ∈ y), the
expression x(n+1) ⊆ y(n+1) is the shorthand for ∀z(n) (z(n) ε x(n+1) → z(n) ε y(n+1)),
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the expression x ⊆ Y is the shorthand for ∀z (z ∈ x → z ε Y ), and the expression
X ⊆ y is the shorthand for ∀z (z ∈ X → z ε y).
The axioms of Hω are:
1. x = y ↔ ∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y) (Extensionality);
2. ∃z∀w(w ∈ z ↔ w ∈ x ∧ w ε Y ) (Separation);
3. y ∈ V(x)↔ (∃z ∈ x)(y ⊆ V(z)) (Defining Axiom for V).
Lemma 2.1. Theory Hω proves the axiom of ε-induction
∀X(∀y((∀z ∈ y)z ε X → y ε X)→ ∀y(y ε X)).
Proof. We say that a class X is progressive if ∀x((∀y ∈ x) y ε X → x ε X). We
define the class WF to be the intersection of all progressive classes. The class WF is
progressive itself. Clearly, if WF = V, then we are done.
Assume for a contradiction that ∃x (x 6 ε WF). Then we consider the class
A = {x ε WF | ∀y 6 ε WF (x ∈ V(y))}.
In other words, A is the intersection
⋂
y6 εWF
V(y).First we prove that A is progressive.
We consider some x ⊆ A and claim that x ∈ A. For this we consider arbitrary y 6 ε WF
and prove that x ∈ V(y). By progressivity of WF there is z 6 ε WF such that z ∈ y.
Since x ⊆ A, by definition of A, we have x ⊆ V(z). By definition of V, the set V(y)
contains any subset of V(z) and thus our claim x ∈ V(y) holds.
Thus WF ⊆ A ⊆ V(x), for any set x 6 ε WF. We fix any x0 6 ε WF and by separation
construct the set wf = {x ∈ V(x0) | x ε WF}. Clearly, wf consists of exactly the
same elements as WF and in particular wf ⊆ WF. Since wf is a set, progressivity of
WF implies that wf ε WF. Hence wf ∈ wf. Observe that the class {x | x 6∈ x} is
progressive, hence wf is an element of this class. Thus wf 6∈ wf, contradiction.
The theory Hω<ω is the extension of H
ω by the axioms stating the existence of all
individual finite von Neumann ordinals. Let Nmb0(x) be the formula ∀y (y 6∈ x) and
let Nmbn+1(x) be the formulas ∃y (Nmbn(y) ∧ ∀z(z ∈ x ↔ z = y ∨ z ∈ y)). Theory
Hω<ω is the extension of H
ω by the axioms ∃x Nmbn(x), for all natural numbers n.
2.3 Ordinal arithmetic in Hω
Due to the fact that the class of intended models of Hω are the models (Vα,∈,V), for
ordinals α > 0, a lot of functions on sets that are total in stronger set theories could
not be proved to be total in Hω. Thus we need to work with partial functions.
We make the following definitions inside Hω:
1. class of transitive sets Trans = {x | ∀y ∈ x y ⊆ x};
2. class of ordinals On = {x | x ε Trans and (∀y ∈ x) y ε Trans};
3. the order < on ordinals is given by the predicate ∈;
4. the ordinal 0 = ∅ (it is defined only if V is non-empty);
5. the partial successor function S : On→ On
β = S(α)
def
⇐⇒ ∀x(x ∈ β ↔ x ∈ α ∨ x = α);
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6. the class of successor ordinals Succ = {α | (∃β ε On) α = S(β)};
7. the class of natural numbers Nat = {α | ∀β ≤ α(β ∈ Succ ∨ β = 0)}.
8. the partial function +: On × On → On that is the only partial function such
that for all α, β ε On
α+ β = sup({α} ∪ {S(α+ γ) | γ < β}),
where the left part is defined whenever the right part is defined, i.e. the values
α+ β should be defined iff the values S(α+ γ) are defined for all γ < β and the
class {α} ∪ {S(α+ γ) | γ < β} have a supremum;
9. the partial function · : On× On→ On is the only partial function such that for
all α, β ε On
α ·β = sup({α · γ + α | γ < β}),
where the left part is defined whenever the right part is defined;
10. the partial base 2 exponentiation 2x : On→ On is the only partial function such
that for all α, β ε On
2α = sup({S(0)} ∪ {2β + 2β | β < α}),
where the left part is defined whenever the right part is defined.
We note that the existence and uniqueness of addition, multiplication, and base 2
exponentiation functions could be proved in a standard fashion. We consider only the
case of addition, since the cases of the rest of the functions could be covered in the same
manner. We call a partial function +′ : On× On → On a partial addition function if
for any ordinals α, β the fact that α+′ β is defined implies that sup({α}∪{S(α+′ γ) |
γ < β}) is defined (along side with all S(α+′ γ), for γ < β) and equal to α+′ β.
Using ε-induction it is easy to show that any two partial addition functions agree on
the pairs of ordinals where they both are defined. We observe that the union of all the
partial addition functions constitute an addition function that satisfies the definition
above. Finally, we use ε-induction to prove uniqueness of partial addition function
that satisfies 8.
Let us consider predicate-only version of arithmetical language, where we have the
predicates x = y, x ≤ y, x = S(y), x = y+z, x = yz, and x = 2y (see [5, Section I.2]).
Our definition of the partial arithmetical function on natural numbers in Hω gives an
interpretation NAT of this version of arithmetical language in the theory Hω.
3 Theory EAset
In the section we will develop a set theory EAset that 1. is bi-interpretable with EA
and 2. proves that same Πset1 (V) sentences of first-order pure set-theoretic language
as Hω proves for hereditarily finite sets.
We note that R. Pettigrew [10] already have proposed set theory theory EA⋆ that
is bi-interpretable with EA. The language of Pettigrew’s theory EA⋆ is the language
of pure first-order set theory, unlike the language of our theory EAset that in addition
uses functions V(x) and P(x). Using both our and Pettigrew’s results about bi-
interpretability, it is easy to show that the theory EAset is just a definitional extension
of the theory EA⋆.
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Let us outline the main differences between our and Pettigrew’s approaches. The
first difference is that due to the richer signature, the axiomatization of EAset is simpler
than the axiomatization of EA⋆. Also there is a difference between the constructed
bi-interpretations. The bi-interpretation that we define consists of two natural in-
terpretations: Ackermann’s interpretation of set theory in arithmetic and cardinal
interpretation of arithmetic in set theory. Pettigrew’s bi-interpretation consisted of
Ackermann’s interpretation of set theory in arithmetic and certain somewhat artificial
interpretation of arithmetic in set theory. However, Pettigrew’s interpretations have
the advantage of being strictly inverse to each other. Wheres our interpretations are
not strictly inverse to each other: the compositions of Ackermann’s and cardinality
interpretations are self-interpretations of EA⋆ and of EA that are not identity inter-
pretations themselves, but rather are definably isomorphic to identity interpretations.
We note that it was possible to use Pettigrew’s result to somewhat shorten the
paper. However, in order to make the presentation in the present paper more self-
sufficient and to make proofs more direct we will not rely on Pettigrew’s paper.
The language of the theory EAset is the language of first-order set theory expanded
by the unary functions V(x) and P(x). We denote by ∆set0 (P ,V) the class of first-
order formulas, where all the quantifiers are of the form (∀x ∈ t) or (∃y ∈ t), for some
term t built of the functions P , V and the variables other than x. And we denote as
Πset1 (P ,V) the class of formulas ∀~x ϕ, where ϕ ∈ ∆
set
0 (P ,V). The expression x ⊆ y is
a shorthand for ∀z (z ∈ x→ z ∈ y).
The theory EAset is axiomatized over the usual first-order logic with equality by
the following axioms.
1. x = y ↔ ∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)) (Extensionality);
2. ∃y∀z (z ∈ y ↔ z ∈ x ∧ ϕ(z)), where ϕ is ∆set0 (P ,V) formula without free
occurrences of y (∆set0 (P ,V)-Separation);
3. y ∈ P(x)↔ y ⊆ x (Defining Axiom for P);
4. y ∈ V(x)↔ (∃z ∈ x)y ∈ P(V(z)) (Defining Axiom for V);
5. ϕ(∅)∧∀x, y (ϕ(x)∧ϕ(y) → ϕ(x∪{y}))→ ∀x ϕ(x), where ϕ range over ∆set0 (P ,V)
(∆set0 (P ,V) Adduction Induction)
2.
First we need to “bootstrap” the theory EAset.
Observe that scheme 5. (in the presence of the scheme of ∆set0 (P ,V)-separation)
implies the usual ε-induction scheme over ∆set0 (P ,V) formulas:
∀x((∀y ∈ x) ϕ(y)→ ϕ(x))→ ∀x ϕ(x),
where ϕ ranges over ∆set0 (P ,V)-formulas.
Note that our axiomatization of EAset does not contain the standard axiom of pair.
This is due to the fact that it follows from other axioms of EAset. However in order
2This formulation of the scheme 5. is not completely accurate. Namely, the axioms 1.–4. by
themselves are too weak to prove that for any two sets x, y there exists their union x ∪ y. Thus in
5. the subformula ϕ(x ∪ {y}) should be read as “if there exists the set x ∪ {y} then ϕ(x ∪ {y})”.
Formally, the scheme 5 have the following formulation in the plain language of EAset:
∃x (∀y ¬y ∈ x ∧ ϕ(x)) ∧ ∀x, y, z(ϕ(x) ∧ ϕ(y) ∧ ∀w(w ∈ z ↔ w ∈ x ∨ w = y)→ ϕ(z))→ ∀x ϕ(x).
We note that the use of this kind of induction axioms for theories of hereditarily finite sets is going
back to the work of Givant and Tarski [3]
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to prove it we first show that both EAset and Hω prove number of natural properties
of V.
Lemma 3.1. Theories EAset and Hω prove that
1. x ⊆ V(x), for all x;
2. for all x the set V(x) is transitive, i.e. (∀y ∈ V(x)) y ⊆ V(x);
3. for all x the set V(x) is closed under subsets, i.e. (∀y ∈ V(x))(∀z ⊆ y) z ∈ V(x);
4. for all x the set V(x) is closed under V, i.e. (∀y ∈ V(x)) V(y) ∈ V(x);
5. V is idempotent, i.e. V(V(x)) = V(x), for all x;
6. V(x) ∈ V(y), or V(x) = V(y), or V(y) ∈ V(x), for all x, y.
Proof. We will prove Claims 1–6 just from extensionality, defining axiom for V, and
the scheme of ε-induction for ∆0(V)-formulas.
We establish Claims 1. and 2. by straightforward ε-induction arguments on x.
Claim 3. follows from transitivity of ⊆-relation and defining axiom for V.
Let us prove 4. by ε-induction on x. To justify the step of induction we need to
show that for a given y ∈ V(x) we have V(y) ∈ V(x) under the assumption that for
all z ∈ x the sets V(z) are closed under V. Indeed, we fix z ∈ x such that y ⊆ V(z).
By induction assumption V(w) ∈ z, for all w ∈ y. Since V(z) is closed under subsets,
P(V(w)) ⊆ V(z), for all w ∈ y. Thus V(y) ⊆ V(z). And finally we conclude that
V(y) ∈ V(x).
Let us prove 5 by showing that V(V(x)) ⊇ V(x) and V(V(x)) ⊆ V(x). By 1. we
have V(V(x)) ⊇ V(x). To show that V(V(x)) ⊆ V(x) we consider any y ∈ V(V(x)) and
prove that y ∈ V(x). By defining axiom for V we have y ⊆ V(z), for some z ∈ V(x).
By 4. the set V(z) ∈ V(x). Combining this with 3. we conclude that y ∈ V(x), which
concludes the proof of 5.
Finally, let us prove 6. For this it is enough to show that for all x and all y, z ∈ V(x)
we have either V(y) ∈ V(z), or V(y) = V(z), or V(z) ∈ V(y). By 5. it is enough to
consider only the case of x = V(x). We prove by ε-induction on x that if x = V(x)
then for all y, z ∈ V(x) we have either V(y) ∈ V(z), or V(y) = V(z), or V(z) ∈ V(y).
Further we justify the step of this induction.
We show that for all y ∈ V(x) and z ⊆ y either V(z) = V(y) or V(z) ∈ V(y). From
defining axiom for V it follows that V(z) ⊆ V(y). Hence it is enough to prove that if
V(z) 6= V(y) then V(z) ∈ V(y). For this we fix any w ∈ V(y) \ V(z) and claim that
V(z) ⊆ V(w); since V(w) ∈ V(y), the claim will imply that V(z) ∈ V(y). To prove
the claim we consider any v ∈ V(z) and show that v ∈ V(w). Since v, w ∈ V(y), by
induction assumption for V(y) either V(v) ∈ V(w), or V(v) = V(w), or V(w) ∈ V(v).
To finish the proof of the claim we just need to rule out the last two cases. Assume
for contradiction that V(v) = V(w). Then by 4. we have V(w) ∈ V(z). And thus by
combination of 1. and 3. we should have w ∈ V(z), contradiction. Now assume for
contradiction that V(w) ∈ V(v). By combination of 4. and 2. we have V(w) ∈ V(z).
Which again leads to a contradiction.
Let us consider any y, z ∈ V(x) and show that either V(y) ∈ V(z), or V(y) = V(z),
or V(z) ∈ V(y). Let w = V(V(y) ∩ V(z)). Using the fact that we established above
we see that either w = V(y) and w = V(z), or w = V(y) and w ∈ V(z), or w ∈ V(y)
and w = V(z), or w ∈ V(y) and w ∈ V(z). Clearly to finish the proof it is enough to
rule out the last case. Assume for a contradiction that w ∈ V(y) and w ∈ V(z). We
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observe that w ∈ V(y) ∩ V(z) = w. But by ε-induction it is easy to prove that no set
could be its own element.
Using the established properties of V it is easy to prove the usual set existence
axioms: axiom of pair, axiom of union, and the axiom of transitive containment. This
allow us to prove in a completely standard fashion that for any two sets x, y there
exists the Kuratowski ordered pair 〈x, y〉 = {{x}, {x, y}}. For two sets we construct
their Cartesian product X × Y = {〈x, y〉 | x ∈ X, y ∈ Y } as a subset of either
P2(V(X)) or P2(V(Y )). Thus we could work with binary relations R ⊆ X × Y and
partial functions f : X → Y in a standard fashion.
3.1 Hω and EAset
In theory Hω we define the class of hereditarily finite sets HF to be
⋃
n∈Nat
V(n), i.e.
that HF is the union of all the finite levels of von Neumann hierarchy.
Proposition 3.2. If ϕ is Πset1 (V) sentence, then
Hω ⊢ ϕHF ⇐⇒ EAset ⊢ ϕ.
In order to prove Proposition 3.2 it will be useful to use an alternative axiomati-
zation of EAset.
Lemma 3.3. The following axioms give an alternative axiomatization of EAset:
1. Extensionality;
2. ∆set0 (V)-Separation;
3. Defining axiom for P;
4. Defining axiom for V;
5. x = ∅ ∨ ∃y ∈ x∀z ∈ x z 6∈ y (Regularity);
6. x ⊆ V(x) ∧ V(x) ⊆ P(V(x)) (operation V maps any x to a transitive set con-
taining x);
7. x = ∅ ∨ ∃y (V(x) = V(P(y))) (every non-empty set lies in a successor level of
von Neumann hierarchy).
Proof. First we verify that the initial axiomatization of EAset proves all the axioms of
the alternative axiomatization that were not present in original axiomatization. We
prove regularity in EAset by ε-induction. Using Lemma 3.1 we prove in EAset that
operation V maps any x to a transitive set containing x. And using Lemma 3.1 Claim
6 we prove by adduction induction on x that any x is either empty or V(x) = V(P(y)),
for some set y.
In other direction we need to verify ∆set0 (V,P)-separation and ∆
set
0 (V,P)-adduction
induction in the alternative axiomatization.
Now let us prove ∆set0 (V,P)-separation. We reason in the alternative axioma-
tization of EAset. Consider a set a and a ∆set0 (V,P)-formula ϕ(x). Our goal is to
construct set {x ∈ a | ϕ(x)}. For this we will find ∆set0 (V)-formula ψ(x) with ad-
ditional parameters such that ∀x ∈ a (ϕ(x) ↔ ψ(x)). Let p1, . . . , pn be all the
parameters of ϕ(x) and let k be the number of P-symbols used in ϕ. We consider sets
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b1 = V(Pk+1(x)), . . . , bn = V(Pk+1(x)). Observe that for any x ∈ a the ranges of all
bounded quantifiers within ϕ(x) are covered by some set bi. Moreover, for any value
v of a term t(~y) from ϕ(x), under a substitution within the range of bounded quan-
tifiers, we will have that w ∈ bi and P(w) ⊆ bi, for some bi. Now using bi-bounded
quantifiers it is easy to transform ϕ(x) to formula ψ(x) with the desired property.
Now in EAset combining regularity, ∆set0 (P ,V)-separation, and the fact that any set
is contained in a transitive set we easily deduce ε-induction for ∆set0 (P ,V) formulas.
Hence the alternative axiomatization of EAset contains theory that we have used in
the proof of Lemma 3.1. And therefore all the facts about V from Lemma 3.1 are
provable in the alternative axiomatization as well. As in the case of EAset, the variant
of Lemma 3.1 for the alternative axiomatization of EAset allows us to construct there
ordered pairs, Cartesian products and hence freely work with binary relations and
functions.
Let us prove by ε-induction in alternative axiomatization of EAset that for any set
x if x = V(x), then there exists a linear order ≤x on x such that
1. ≤x extends ⊆ relation,
2. for any y we have y ≤x {y}, if y, {y} ∈ x,
3. the order ≤x is well-founded,
4. the order inverse to ≤x is also well-founded.
The case of empty x is trivial. In the case of non-empty x we fix y such that V(P(y)) =
x. By Lemma 3.1, P(V(y)) = x. Since y = V(y) and y ∈ x, we could use ε-induction
assumption for y, i.e. the existence of ≤y. We define ≤x to be
z1 ≤x z2
def
⇐⇒ z1 = z2 or z1 6= z2 ∧min
≤y
(z1 △ z2) 6∈ z1.
Essentially, ≤x is the lexicographic order induced by ≤y. A routine check shows that
≤x have the desired properties.
We derive ∆set0 (V,P) adduction induction in the alternative axiomatization as fol-
lows. Suppose a ∆set0 (V,P)-property ϕ(x) is adductively progressive (i.e. the premise
of adduction induction holds for it). Let us fix a and prove ϕ(a). We consider the
set b = P(V(a)) and correspondign order ≤b. Observe that ϕ(x) is progressive for
this order, i.e. ∀x ∈ b (∀y <b x ϕ(y) → ϕ(x)). And since ϕ(x) is ∆set0 (P ,V)-formula,
using ∆set0 (P ,V)-separation and well-foundedness of ≤b we show that ∀x ∈ b ϕ(x). In
particular we have ϕ(a).
Remark 3.4. With additional efforts one could show that even if we remove axiom
of regularity from axiomatization in Lemma 3.3, the resulting system still will be
deductively equivalent to EAset. A finite axiomatization of EAset could be achieved by
replacement of the scheme of ∆set0 -separation by a version of the axioms of rudimentary
closure that accounts for V-function (for a more usual version of axioms of rudimentary
closure see [12, Section VII.2]).
Now we are ready to prove Proposition 3.2.
Proof. Suppose ϕ is of the form ∀~x ψ(~x), where ψ is ∆set0 (V) formula. Everywhere in
the proof we will use the alternative axiomatization of EAset form Lemma 3.3.
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First assume that Hω ⊢ ϕHF. We fix some proof p of ϕHF in Hω. We find a natural
number n such that all the sorts of objects used in p have indexes ≤ n. Let us reason
in EAset and prove ϕ. We consider some sets ~a and claim that ψ(~a). We consider any
set b such that all a’s are elements of b. Next we consider model M of the signature of
Hω restricted to the sorts ≤ n, where the domain d0 of the sort 0 is V(b), the domain
di+1 of a sort i+ 1 is P(di), and all the membership predicates are interpreted as ∈.
In a straightforward manner we carry out the proof p inside M: we assemble our EAset
proof from checks that M |= χ for all the (logical or non-logical) axioms χ that occur
in p and then just follow the inference rules that were used in p. This way we ensure
that M |= ϕHF. By adduction induction we show that all the sets in M are elements
of HFM. Hence M |= ϕ and thus M |= ψ(~a). Observe that since the first-order part
of M is a transitive model with the standard interpretation of V, the ∆set0 (V) formula
ψ is absolute for M. Hence we conclude that ψ(~a).
Let us now assume that Hω 0 ϕHF and show that EAset 0 ϕ. We have a model M
of Hω, where ϕHF fails. We will construct a model Mu |= EAset + ¬ϕ. But first we
will construct from M a model Mf of Hω that is a counter-model for ϕ but also
M
f |= V = HF and Mf |= ∀x (x ⊆ V(s)), for some s ∈ HFM
f
.
We fix some ~a = (a1, . . . , ak) consisting of elements of HF
M such that M 6|= ψ(~a).
By Lemma 3.1 there should be i0 such that M |= V(ai) ⊆ V(ai0), for all j from 1
to k. We put s = ai0 . We obtain M
f from M by restricting the sets of type 0 to
M-subsets of V(s). More formally Mf is a submodel of M, where we restrict type
0 to M-class D0 consisisting of all M-subsets of V(s). And where we restrict types
n+ 1 to n+ 2-sets Dn+1 in M such that Dn+1 = (P(Dn))M.
We define model Mu to be the collapse of the higher types in Mf to an untyped
set structure. Formally we define in Mf the relations ∈i on the sets of the type i: ∈0
is just ∈, and ∈i+1 is
a(i+1) ∈i+1 b
(i+1) def⇐⇒ (∃x(i) ε b(i+1))∀y(i)(y(i) ε a(i+1) ↔ y(i) ∈i x
(i)).
For each i we define the model Mui to be the model of pure set-theoretic signature
which domain consists of all the sets of the type i from M and ∈ is interpreted as ∈i.
Naturally we have end-embeddings of Mui into M
u
i+1
ei : A
(i) 7−→ {X(i) | X(i) ∈i A
(i)}.
To simplify our notations we will assume (without loss of generality that the sequence
M
u
i just form a sequence of expanding models (e.g. M
u
i ⊆M
u
i+1 and for any a ∈M
u
i
we have ei(a) = a). We expand M
u
i by total functions V(x) and partial functions
P(x). The function V in Mu0 coincides with V from M
f . The function V in Mui+1
extends V from Mui by mapping any a ∈ M
u
i+1 \M
u
i to the ⊆-greatest element of
M
u
i+1 (in M
f it is the type i + 1 set consisting of all type i sets). We define P in
M
u
i+1 for all a ∈ M
u
i to be the powerset of a (inside M
u
i+1). It is easy to see that P
from Mui extends P from M
u
j , for i > j. And that for any a ∈M
u
i , the powerset P(a)
is defined in Mui+1. The model M
u is the union of all Mui ’s. Clearly M
u is a model
with total powerset function.
A routine check shows that all the models Mui satisfy all the axioms of the al-
ternative axiomatizations of EAset other than the defining axiom for P . Since all
this axioms were Πset2 (V)-sentences, they also holds in M
u. Hence Mu is a model of
EA
set.
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Remark 3.5. By the same technique as above it is easy to prove that for Πset1
sentences
wEA
set ⊢ ϕ ⇐⇒ Hω ⊢ ϕ,
where wEAset is EAset with the scheme of adduction induction for ∆0(P ,V)-formulas
replaced by the scheme of ε-induction for ∆0(P ,V)-formulas.
3.2 Cardinal arithmetic in EAset and the theory EA
The standard informal definition of cardinal numbers is that they are equivalence
classes of sets with respect to equinumerocity relation. Unfortunately this equivalence
classes do not form sets. And in order to work with cardinal numbers as individual
sets they should be represented as some sets from which it is possible to recover the re-
spective equivalence class. The most well-known solution to this (that is typically used
in ZFC) is to define the cardinal number |x| to be the least ordinal α such that there
is a bijection f : x→ α. A different solution (that sometimes is used in ZF) is to de-
fine cardinal number |x| to be the set {y | y ∈ Vα and there is a bijection f : x→ y},
where α is the least ordinal for which there exists y ∈ Vα and a bijection f : x → y.
It is possible to show that EAset does prove axiom of choice and Zermelo theorem.
However, EAset does not prove Mostowski transitive collapse theorem and even that
every set is equinumerous to an ordinal. Thus the ZFC-style definition of cardinal
numbers is not suitable for EAset.
We will use ZF-style cardinals within EAset. We put
|a| = {y | y ∈ V(b) and there is a bijection f : a→ y},
where V(b) is the smallest level of von-Neumann hierarchy such that there exists at
least one y ∈ V(b) equinumerous with a. For two cardinals c, d we write c ≤ d if
there is an injection from some x ∈ c into some y ∈ d. For two cardinals c, d the
cardinal c+ d is the cardinality of the disjoint union |x⊔ y|, for some x ∈ c and y ∈ d
(as usual x ⊔ y = x × {∅} ∪ y × {{∅}}). For two cardinals c, d the cardinal cd is the
cardinal of Cartesian product |x × y|, for some x ∈ c and y ∈ d. For a cardinal c
the cardinal 2c is the cardinal of the powerset |P(x)|, for some x ∈ c. It is easy to
check that the definitions of addition, multiplication, and exponentiation indeed give
well-defined functions.
Henceforth the cardinal arithmetic gives us an embedding CRD of the arithmetical
language with the predicates =,≤, constant 0, and functions S,+,×, x 7−→ 2x into the
theory EAset. Below we will show that CRD is an interpretation of Kalmar elementary
functions arithmetic EA.
Recall that EA is a first-order theory, which language is the arithmetical language
with exponentiation function (as in the paragraph above). The non-logical axioms of
EA are
1. S(x) 6= 0;
2. S(x) = S(y)→ x = y;
3. x+ 0 = x;
4. x+ S(y) = S(x+ y);
5. x0 = 0;
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6. xS(y) = xy + x;
7. 20 = 1;
8. 2S(x) = 2x + 2x;
9. x ≤ 0↔ x = 0;
10. x ≤ S(y)↔ x ≤ y ∨ x = S(y);
11. ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(S(x)))→ ∀x ϕ(x), where ϕ is ∆0 (∆0-Ind).
Proposition 3.6. CRD is an interpretation of EA in EAset.
Proof. In a straightforward manner we prove the CRD-translations of the axioms
1.–10. of EA.
Observe that the CRD-translation of an instance of mathematical induction
CRD(ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(S(x)))→ ∀x ϕ(x))
is implied by the following instance of adduction induction
∀x, y(CRD(ϕ(|x|)) ∧ CRD(ϕ(|y|))→ CRD(ϕ(|x ∪ {y}|)))→ ∀x CRD(ϕ(|x|)).
Thus in order to prove that ∆0-Ind holds in the interpretation CRD it is enough to
show that for any ∆0 formula ϕ(x, y1, . . . , yn) the formula CRD(ϕ(|x|, |y1|, . . . , |yn|))
is equivalent to a ∆set0 (P ,V) formula in EA
set.
Suppose f(x1, . . . , xn) is a definable over EA
set function, i.e. there is a fixed formula
Grf (x1, . . . , xn, y) defining the graph of f such that
EA
set ⊢ ∀x1, . . . , xn∃!y (Grf (x1, . . . , xn, y)).
We say that f(x1, . . . , xn) have constant rank property if additionally over EA
set the
formula Grf is equivalent to a ∆
set
0 (P ,V) formula and there is a number rf such that
EA
set ⊢ (∀x1, . . . , xn, p, y) (Grf (x1, . . . , xn, y)→
y ∈ Prf+1(V(x1)) ∨ . . . ∨ y ∈ P
rf+1(V(xn)) ∨ y ∈ P
rf+1(V(p))).
Obviously, P and V have constant rank property with rP = 1 and rV = 0.
Let functions f1, . . . , fn have constant rank property. And let us consider the
naturally defined class of formulas ∆set0 (P ,V, f1, . . . , fn) that consists of all the for-
mulas with bounded quantifiers in the signature with predicates ∈,= and the func-
tions P ,V, f1, . . . , fn. We prove that each ∆set0 (P ,V, f1, . . . , fn) formula ϕ(~x) is
EA
set-provably equivalent to a ∆set0 (P ,V) formula ϕ
′(~x, p). We achieve this in two
steps. First, by induction on a term construction we show that each term t(~x)
built of functions with constant rank property is itself a function with constant
rank property. For induction step we use Lemma 3.1 Claim 6 to show that if
f(x1, . . . , xn) and u1(y1, . . . , ym), . . . , un(y1, . . . , ym) have constant rank properties,
then g(y1, . . . , ym) = f(u1(y1, . . . , ym), . . . , un(y1, . . . , ym)) have constant rank prop-
erty with rg = rf + max(ru1 , . . . , run). Second, by induction on construction of
∆set0 (P ,V, f1, . . . , fn) formulas ψ(~x) we construct EA
set-provably equivalent ∆set0 (P ,V)
formulas ψ′(~x, p). Here both the base and the step of induction are easy to justify
using the fact that any term built of P ,V , f1, . . . , fn is a function with constant rank
property.
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It is easy to see that all the functions of cardinal arithmetic (including constant
0) have constant rank property. That the comparison of cardinals is definable by a
∆set0 (P ,V) formula. And that the functions x 7−→ |x|, dc : x 7−→ {|y| | |y| ≤ |x|} have
constant rank property.
In terms of dc we easily replace cardinality-bounded quantifiers with bounded
membership quantifiers: formula ∀y(|y| ≤ |t| → ϕ(|y|)) is EAset-equivalent to ∀y ∈
dc(t) ϕ(y). Thus, for any arithmetical ∆0-formula ψ(x1, . . . , xn), the translation
CRD(ψ(|x1|, . . . , |xn|)) is EA
set-provably equivalent to some∆set0 (P ,V, 0, S,+,×, x 7−→
2x, x 7−→ |x|, dc) formula ψ′(x1, . . . , xn). And by the above ψ′ is EA
set-provably equiv-
alent to a ∆set0 (P ,V)-formula ψ
′′(x1, . . . , xn, p).
Applying this construction to the case of formula ϕ(x) we conclude the proof of
the lemma.
3.3 Bi-interpretability of EAset and EA
In this section we show that, this two theories enjoy nicer connection than just exis-
tence of an interpretation of EA in EAset. Namely, we will show that the interpretation
CRD together with Ackermann’s interpretation of EAset in EA form a bi-interpretation
between the theories.
The notion of bi-interpretability is a strong equivalence between first-order the-
ories. For example, there is a bi-interpretation between Tarski’s geometry and the
theory of real closed fields. The notion most naturally could be defined in the category-
theoretic setting: two theories are called bi-interpretable if there is an equivalence
between them in 2-category of interpretations (see [17]). In more explicit terms, a
bi-interpretation between first-order theories T and U is a tuple 〈i, j, k, l〉 such that
1. i : T ⊳ U is an interpretation of T in U ,
2. j : U ⊳ T is an interpretation of U in T ,
3. k is a definable isomorphism between the interpretation idU : U ⊲ U and the
composition j ◦ i,
4. l is a definiable isomorphism between the interpretation idT : T ⊲ T and i ◦ j.
A definable isomorphism u between iterpretations i1, i2 : T ⊳ U is an U -definable bi-
jection between the domains of i1 and i2 such that in any model M of U the function
uM is an isomorphism of the models iM1 and i
M
2 of the theory T .
Recall that the Ackermann’s membership predicate n ∈Ack m is “the n-th bit
of the number m is equal to 1”. It could be naturally defined in the arithmetical
language:
x ∈Ack y
def
⇐⇒ (∃z, w) (y = z2x+1 + w ∧ w < 2x+1 ∧ w ≥ 2x).
Theory EA could develop number of standard set-theoretic constructions in term
of Ackermann’s membership (see the book by Ha´jek and Pudla´k [5, Section I.1(b)]).
In particular in [5] it have been proved in EA that ∈Ack satisfies extensionality and
powerset axioms. The latter fact allows us to define in EA the function PAck(x) that
maps a number x to its powerset with respect to ∈Ack.
Moreover, we naturally could define VAck function. It is a well-known fact that it
is possible to define the graph of the superexponentiation function
2x0 = x, 2
x
y+1 = 2
2xy (1)
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by a ∆0 arithmetical formula and to prove in EA that the partial function 2
x
y satisfies
the equalities (1) (in the sense that both the sides of the equalities are simultaneously
defined or undefined and if they are defined then they are equal). We define VAck(x)
to be the least y of the form 20z − 1 such that y ≥ x. It is easy to see that EA proves
that VAck(x) is a total function and that VAck(x) ≤ 2x. Simple check shows EA proves
the defining axiom for V within this interpretation.
Thus we have defined embedding ACK of the language of EAset into the language
of arithmetic. Clearly, the predicate ∈Ack and the functions V(x), P(x) are Kalmar
elementary. Therefore, for each set-theoretic ∆set0 (P ,V) formula ϕ(~x) we could find
∆0 formula ϕ
′(~x) that is EA-provably equivalent to ACK(ϕ(~x)). This allows us to
prove in EA the ACK-translations of all the instances of ∆set0 (P ,V)-separation and
∆set0 (P ,V) adduction induction. This concludes the proof of the fact that ACK is an
interpretation of EAset in EA.
The isomorphism k between idEA and CRD◦ACK is the Kalmar elementary func-
tion that maps a number x to the ∈Ack-cardinal that represent the class of equivalence
of ∈Ack-sets with precisely x elements.
The isomorphism l between idEAset and ACK◦CRD should be a function that maps
a set x to the cardinal number c that represents the set x with respect to CRD(∈Ack).
We see that l should satisfy the following equation
l(x) =
∑
y∈x
2l(y). (2)
Here the cardinal
∑
y∈x
2l(y) could be formally defined as the cardinality of
⋃
y∈x
f(y)×{y},
where f is any set-size function with dom(f) = x that maps a set y to a set with
cardinality 2l(y). We prove by ε-induction on sets a that partial function la : V(a)→
P(V(a)) that satisfies the equation (2) exists and unique. And then we define the
desired function l to be the union of all la’s. Using (2) it is straightforward to show
that we have indeed defined the desired isomorphism l.
Thus we have proved
Theorem 3.7. The interpretation ACK : EA⊲EAset and the interpretation CRD : EAset⊲
EA form a bi-interpretation. Hence EA proves a sentence ϕ whenever EAset proves
CRD(ϕ) and EAset proves a sentence ψ whenever EAset proves ACK(ψ)
Corollary 3.8. For any Πset1 (V) sentence ϕ
Hω ⊢ ϕHF ⇐⇒ EA ⊢ ACK(ϕ).
3.4 Ordinal arithmetic and superexponential cut
As in the case of Hω we define ordinals in EAset to be transitive sets consisting only
of transitive sets. Clearly, we could express by a ∆set0 (P ,V) formula x ∈ On the fact
that set x is an ordinal.
Using powerset axiom it is easy to prove the totality of the successor function
on ordinals. We want to give ∆set0 (P ,V) formulas for graphs of partial functions
+,×, α 7−→ 2α of ordinal arithmetic that satisfy the standard recursive definitions:
1. α+ β = sup({α} ∪ {S(α+ γ) | γ < β});
2. α · β = sup{α · γ + α | γ < β};
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3. 2α = sup{2β + 2β | β < α}.
Since all the functions are defined in the same manner, we give the definition only
for addition function. We consider the partial addition functions +δ : δ × δ → δ such
that
1. α+δ β is defined iff
(a) α, β ∈ δ,
(b) for all γ < β the value α+δ γ is defined,
(c) sup({α} ∪ {S(α+δ γ) | γ < β}) ∈ δ;
2. if α+δ β is defined then α+δ β = sup({α} ∪ {S(α+δ γ) | γ < β}).
The existence and uniqueness of partial functions +δ is proved by induction on δ. We
define
α+ β = γ
def
⇐⇒ α+S(γ) β = γ.
The ordinal arithmetic gives us an embedding ON of the predicate-only version of
arithmetical language into the language of EAset.
The proof of Proposition 3.2 could be modified to obtain the following:
Lemma 3.9. For any Πpred1 sentence ϕ
H
ω ⊢ NAT (ϕ) ⇐⇒ EAset ⊢ ON (ϕ).
Proof. The proof of Proposition 3.2 consisted of two parts: 1. to transform an Hω-
proof of ϕHF into an EAset-proof of ϕ and 2. to transform an Hω-model of ¬ϕHF into
an EAset-model of ¬ϕ.
The analogue of part 1. for the present lemma is a transformation of Hω-proof of
NAT (ϕ) into an EAset-proof of ON (ϕ). The addition to the proof from Proposition
3.2 is that we need to verify that the ordinal arithmetic in the model M that we
obtain from the definition of ordinal arithmetic for the theory Hω coincide with the
restriction of EAset ordinal arithmetic to the model. This could be achieved by a
trivial proof by induction (inside EAset).
And the analogue of part 2. for the present lemma is a transformation of an
Hω-model of ¬NAT (ϕ) into an EAset-model of ¬ON (ϕ). Here the modification of
the construction from Proposition 3.2 is that we need to ensure that the ordinal
arithmetic is preserved when we transit from M to Mf and when we transit from Mf
to Mu. Which again could be done by a straightforward arguments by ε-induction
(in Hω).
The superexponential cut S in EA is:
x ∈ S
def
⇐⇒ 20x is defined.
It is easy to observe that EA proves that S is a cut, i.e. that
x ∈ S ⇒ x+ 1 ∈ S and ∀y ≤ x(y ∈ S).
For a sentence ϕ of predicate-only version of arithmetical language, the sentence ϕS
is the relativization of ϕ to S, i.e. ϕS is ϕ, where all the quantifiers ∀x and ∃x are
replaced with the quantifiers (∀x ∈ S) and (∃x ∈ S), respectively.
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Lemma 3.10. Suppose ϕ is a sentence of predicate-only version of arithmetical lan-
guage. Then
EA ⊢ ϕS ⇐⇒ EAset ⊢ ON (ϕ).
Proof. First let us prove in EAset that the definable function x 7−→ |x| maps ordinals
to the elements of the class SCRD (the cut S inside interpretation CRD). We show
this by proving by induction on ordinals α that CRD(20x = y), where x = |α| and
y = |V(α)|.
On the other hand, inside EA for numbers x ∈ S we could define function on(x):
on(0) = 0; on(x+ 1) = on(x) + 2on(x).
It is well-defined since on(x) < 20x+1. The intuition behind on is that it maps a number
x to the von Neumann ordinal x with respect to ∈Ack.
We observe that x 7−→ |x| and on are inverse to each other in the following sense.
Recall that k is a EA-definable isomorphism between the interpretation idEA and
ACK ◦ CRD and l is a EA-definable isomorphism between the interpretation idEAset
and CRD ◦ ACK; both k and l were defined in Section 3.3. From one side, in EA
we could prove by induction on x ∈ S that k(|on(x)|Ack) = x, where y 7−→ |y|Ack is
the cardinality function according to the interpretation ACK. From the other side, in
EA
set by induction on ordinals α we show that l(onCrd(|α|)) = α, where onCrd is the
on function inside the interpretation CRD.
Now we conclude that the theory EA proves that on is a bijection between S and
ordinals according to ACK interpretation and that EAset proves that x 7−→ |x| is a
bijection between the class of ordinals ON and the cut SCRD.
By induction we prove in EAset that x 7−→ |x| is an isomorphism between predicate-
only arithmetic on ordinals and the predicate-only arithmetic on elements of S inside
CRD. By induction we prove in EA that on is an isomorphism between predicate-
only arithmetic on S and the predicate-only arithmetic on ordinals according to the
interpretation ACK.
The last fact about isomorphism together with Theorem 3.7 concludes the proof
Combining Lemma 3.9 and Lemma 3.10 we get
Lemma 3.11. For each Πpred1 sentence ϕ
Hω ⊢ NAT (ϕ) ⇐⇒ EA ⊢ ϕS .
4 Consistency Proof
We fix some natural arithmetization of many sorted first-order logic in arithmetic.
Typical arithmetizations of logic that one could find in the literature (for example [5])
are arithmetizations of one sorted first-order logic, or just the first-order arithmetical
language. However, there are no essential differences between the arithmetizations of
one sorted and many sorted logics, thus we will not develop the details of this kind
of arithmetization in the present paper.
As it will bee seen from the proofs, our results about provability of consistency
are rather robust with respect to the choice of particular formula expressing the fact
that something is a proof of contradiction. We need the theory EA to be able to
naturally work with the formulas and proofs. In addition EA should be able to prove
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that for each proof p and formula ϕ (we identify formulas and proofs with their Go¨del
numbers) p ≥ 2|ϕ|, where |ϕ| is the length of ϕ. And EA should prove that for each
proof p we have p ≥ 2tp, where tp is the number of distinct types of objects used in
p. We note that those are very mild assumptions. For example, this conditions are
verified if EA proves that ϕ ≥ 2|ϕ|, for each formula ϕ and that p ≥ ϕ, for each proof
p and formula ϕ in it.
Recall that we treat Hω<ω as a many sorted first-order theory. It is fairly obvious
that the set of axioms of Hω<ω is Kalmar elementary, i.e. that it is definable by an
arithmetical ∆0 formula. We have Σ1 formula PrfCntHω<ω(p) that is a formalization of
p is a Go¨del number of a Hilbert-style proof of ∃x ¬x = x from axioms of T .
The formula Con(Hω<ω) is ∀p ¬PrfCntHω<ω(p).
We would like to prove consistency of Hω<ω in H
ω. But we have only the em-
bedding of predicate-only arithmetic language in Hω rather than the full arithmetic
language. Thus we EA-equivalently transform formula PrfCntHω<ω (p) to a Σ
pred
1 for-
mula PrfCntpredHω<ω(p) and EA-equivalently transform the formula Con(H
ω
<ω) to the form
Con
pred(Hω<ω):
∀p ¬PrfCntpredHω<ω(p).
Lemma 4.1. EA proves (Conpred(Hω<ω))
S .
Proof. Let us reason in EA. Clearly, it would be enough to show that ¬PrfCntHω<ω(p),
for all p ∈ S.
For a contradiction we assume that there exists a proof p ∈ S of ∃x ¬x = x
from axioms of Hω<ω. Let n be the greatest number such that the proof p uses the
axiom ∃x Nmbn(x). And suppose that the types used in p are k0, . . . , km−1. From
the conditions on Go¨del numbering that we have outlined above we see that p ≥ 2n
and p ≥ 2m. And since p ∈ S, the value 20n+m is defined.
Let us now define a finite model M of all the axioms used in p. The domain of
k0 is the n-th level of von Neumann hierarchy Vn+1 with respect to ∈Ack (it is the
set of all numbers ≤ 20n+1 − 1). The domain of the sort ki is Vn+i with respect to
∈Ack. We interpret ∈ and all relevant εi predicates as ∈Ack, we interpret V by VAck
from Section 3.3. A straightforward check shows that the defined structure M indeed
satisfies all the axioms used in p. And next we show by induction on subproofs of
p that all the formulas in p are satisfied in M. We note that the latter is possible
since the property of a formula to be true in M is ∆0 (this is due to the fact that our
version of arithmetic language contains exponentiation). Thus ∃x ¬x = x is satisfied
in M, contradiction.
Theorem 4.2. Hω proves NAT (Conpred(Hω<ω)).
Proof. Since Conpred(Hω<ω) is equivalent to Π
pred
1 sentence, we get the theorem by
combination of Lemma 3.11 and Lemma 4.1.
Remark 4.3. Observe that in the proof of Theorem 4.2 we used only one direction
of Lemma 3.11. Namely we employed the implication
EA ⊢ ϕS ⇒ Hω ⊢ NAT (ϕ),
for Πpred1 sentences ϕ. The inspection of the proof shows that in order to establish
just this direction of Lemma 3.11 it was possible to avoid the development of the bi-
interpretation between EA and EAset. And just develop the appropriate interpretation
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of EA in EAset. However, we consider Theorem 3.7, Lemma 3.10, and Lemma 3.11 to
be interesting on their own merit and thus include them into the paper.
5 Theory H is non-Go¨delian
In this section we sketch the proof of the fact that theory H<ω proves its own consis-
tency. The reasons of why it is the case are roughly speaking the same as for the case
of the theory Hω<ω. We dedicated the main part of the paper to the case of higher-
order theory since the conservation results for Hω are in our opinion more appealing
and since the development of ordinal arithmetic in Hω is more straightforward.
Recall that the theory H is a first-order theory with equality which signature
contains the binary membership predicate ∈ and the unary function V. Axioms of H:
1. x = y ↔ ∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)) (Extensionality);
2. ∃y∀z(z ∈ y ↔ z ∈ x ∧ ϕ(z)), where ϕ range over formulas without free occur-
rences of the variable y (Separation);
3. y ∈ V(x)↔ (∃z ∈ x)(y ⊆ V(z)) (Defining Axiom for V).
We will start with proving the analogue of Lemma 2.1. However for this we will
need to work with classes in theory H. We do it in the same style as in other first-order
set theory: classes are collections of sets {x | ϕ(x)}, where ϕ(x) is some first-order
formula (possibly with parameters). In this approach, of course, we could not do
quantifications over classes.
Lemma 5.1. Theory H prove any instances of the scheme of ε-induction:
∀x((∀y ∈ x)ϕ(y)→ ϕ(x))→ ∀x ϕ(x).
Proof. We are going to adopt the proof of Lemma 2.1. The only obstacle is that
the least progressive class WF have been defined as the intersection of all progressive
classes and this definition could not be directly mimicked in a first-order theory. To
address this we will give an alternative definition of WF (by a first-order formula),
prove in H that WF is a progressive class, and prove in H a scheme of a theorem that
if C is a progressive class then WF ⊆ C. With the use of this kind of definition of the
class WF we could directly adopt other parts of the proof of Lemma 2.1 for the case
of H.
We define the class WF to be the intersection of the classes
1. WFpre1 consisting of of all x such that V(x) is transitive;
2. WFpre2 consisting of of all x such that x ⊆ V(x);
3. WFpre3 consisting of of all x such that there is a ∈-minimal element in any non-
empty y ⊆ V(x).
Using the defining axiom for V it is easy to show that WFpre1 , WF
pre
2 , and WF
pre
3 are
progressive classes. Thus WF is progressive. Let us finally show that WF is the least
progressive class. We consider a progressive class C, set x ∈ WF and claim that x ∈ C.
Since x ⊆ V(x) and C is progressive it would be enough to show that V(x) ⊆ C. To
achieve the latter goal we assume for a contradiction that the set V(x) \ C is non-
empty. We know that any non-empty subset of V(x) have a ∈-minimal element. Let
y ∈ V(x) \ C be a ∈-minimal element. We have y ⊆ C. The transitivity of the set
V(x) implies that y ⊆ C. And by progressivity of C we get y ∈ C, contradiction.
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The standard definitions (as in Section 2.3) of classes Trans,On,Nat, order <,
and constant 0 could be carried out in H in a standard fashion. However, we could
not construct the functions of ordinal arithmetic in H exactly in the same way we
have done it in Hω or EAset. Let us focus on the case of addition function, since
multiplication and exponentiation functions could be defined in essentially the same
way. Unlike Hω, in H we do not have access to quantification over partial class-
functions +′ : On× On→ On. And unlike EAset, in H we could not construct set-size
partial function +δ : δ×δ → δ: the set +δ is constructed as a subset of P(P(P(P(δ)))).
However, it is possible to modify the approach base of the function +δ to the
case of H. We consider the classes V−n: the class V−0 = V and the class V−(n+1)
is the class of all sets x such that x ∈ y for some y ∈ V −n. Due to the totality of
V function, for any x ∈ V−(n+1) the powerset P(x) is defined and lies in V−n. We
denote by On−n the class On∩V−n and by Nat−n the class Nat∩V−n. By ε-induction
we prove existence and uniqueness for all δ ∈ On−4 of the partial set-size functions
+δ : δ × δ → δ such that
1. α +δ β is defined iff α, β ∈ δ, for all γ < β the value α +δ γ is defined, and
sup({α} ∪ {S(α+δ γ) | γ < β}) ∈ δ;
2. if α+δ β is defined then α+δ β = sup({α} ∪ {S(α+δ γ) | γ < β}).
Next we define the class-size function +−5 : On−5 × On−5 → On−5 as the union of
all partial addition functions +δ, for δ ∈ On
−4. Observe that the difference between
On
−5 and On is that there could be at most 5 topmost ordinals that are in On but
not in On−5. Hence by separate consideration of this topmost ordinals we could give
a first-order definition of a partial addition function +: On× On→ On such that for
all α, β ∈ On we have
α+ β = sup({α} ∪ {S(α+ γ) | γ < β}).
By ε-induction we prove that + is the unique class function that satisfies this recursive
definition.
After development of ordinal arithmetic in H we modify the interpretation NAT
with the definitions that work in H (in Hω it is easy to prove the equivalence of the
definitions in the new version of NAT and the version of NAT from Section 2.3).
Hence we have an embedding of predicate-only arithmetical language into H. We also
denote by NAT −n the modification of the interpretation NAT with the domain of
the interpretation being the class Nat−n = Nat ∩ V−n rather than the class Nat.
The following result is a version of Lemma 3.11 for the case of H:
Lemma 5.2. Suppose ϕ is a Πpred1 sentence. Then
EA ⊢ ϕS ⇐⇒ for some n we have H ⊢ NAT −n(ϕ).
Proof. By Lemma 3.10 it will be enough to prove that
EA
set ⊢ ON (ϕ) ⇐⇒ for some n we have H ⊢ NAT −n(ϕ).
Assume H ⊢ NAT −n(ϕ). Then we reason in EAset to prove ON (ϕ). The sentence
ϕ is of the form ∀x1, . . . , xk ψ(x1, . . . , xk), where ψ is ∆
pred
0 . We consider some
ordinals α1, . . . , αk and claim that ON (ψ(α1, . . . , αk)). We consider the transitive
set M = V(max(α1, . . . , αk) + n + 1). Observe that M = (M,∈,V) is a transitive
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model of H such that ordinal arithmetic inside M (given by the definitions for the
theory H) coincide with the standard ordinal arithmetic restricted toM . And observe
that all αi are in the class Nat
−n of the model M. By internalization of H proof of
NAT −n(ϕ) we get that M |= NAT −n(ϕ) and hence M |= NAT (ψ(α1, . . . , αk)).
Thus ON (ψ(α1, . . . , αk)).
Now assume that for all n we have H 0 NAT −n(ϕ). We are going to construct
a model of EAset, where ON (ϕ) fails. By compactness there is a model M of H with
M-naturals α1, . . . , αk such that M 6|= ψ(α1, . . . , αk) and M 6|= αi ∈ Nat
−n, for any
1 ≤ i ≤ k and n ≥ 0. We consider the intersection N of all M-classes Nat−n (for
standard n). And next we consider the submodel N of M that consists of all a ∈ M
such that M |= a ∈ V(α), for some α ∈ N . Using axiomatization of EAset from Lemma
3.3 it is easy to see that N is a model of EAset. And from construction it is clear that
N |= ON (ϕ).
For a rational a > 0 we denote as aS the cut consisting of numbers x such that
[x/a] ∈ S.
Corollary 5.3. Suppose ϕ is a Πpred1 sentence, EA ⊢ ϕ
2S . Then H ⊢ NAT (ϕ).
Proof. Let us define interpretation SUM of the predicate-only arithmetical language
in itself such that numbers are interpreted by pairs of numbers (x1, x2) which intended
value is x1+x2. The key feature of SUM is that all the quantifiers in the translations
of atomic formulas are bounded. This allows us to verify the properties of SUM in
theory H that could not even prove totality of successor function.
The interpretation of equality (x1, x2) =
⋆ (y1, y2) is ∆
pred
0 formula
(∃z ≤ y1)(x1 + z = y1 ∧ y2 + z = x2) ∨ (∃z ≤ y2)(x2 + z = y2 ∧ y1 + z = x1).
The interpretation of comparison (x1, x2) ≤⋆ (y1, y2) is ∆
pred
0 formula
(∃z1, z2 ≤ y1)(z1 ≤ z2 ∧ x1 + z2 = y1 ∧ y2 + z1 = x2)∨
(∃z1, z2 ≤ y2)(z1 ≤ z2 ∧ x2 + z2 = y2 ∧ y1 + z1 = x1).
The interpretation of successor function graph S((x1, x2)) =
⋆ (y1, y2) is ∆
pred
0 formula
(∃z1, z2 ≤ y1)(S(z1) = z2 ∧ x1 + z2 = y1 ∧ y2 + z1 = x2)∨
(∃z1, z2 ≤ y2)(S(z1) = z2 ∧ x2 + z2 = y2 ∧ y1 + z1 = x1).
The interpretation (x1, x2) + (x3, x4) =
⋆ (y1, y2) of addition function graph is a ∆
pred
0
formula that expresses the fact that there exist splittings x1 = z1,1 + z1,2, x2 =
z2,1+ z2,2, x3 = z3,1+ z3,2, and x4 = z4,1+ z4,2 such that y1 = z1,1+ z2,1+ z3,1+ z4,1
and y2 = z1,2 + z2,2 + z3,2 + z4,2. The interpretation (x1,1, x1,2)(x2,1, x2,2) =
⋆ (y1, y2)
of multiplication function graph is a ∆pred0 formula that expresses the fact that for all
1 ≤ i, j ≤ 2 there exists splitting xi,j = zi,j,1 + zi,j,2 such that
1. z1,i1,j1z2,i2,j2 ≤ max(y1, y2), for all 1 ≤ i1, i2, j1, j2 ≤ 2;
2. for 1 ≤ i1, i2, j1, j2, k ≤ 2 there exist wi1,i2,j1,j2,k ≤ yk such that
(a) wi1,i2,j1,j2,1 + wi1,i2,j1,j2,2 = z1,i1,j1z2,i2,j2 , for all 1 ≤ i1, i2, j1, j2 ≤ 2 (we
use the condition 1. above to make the comparison in a ∆pred0 formula),
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(b)
∑
1≤i1,i2,j1,j2≤2
wi1,i2,j1,j2,k = yk, for 1 ≤ k ≤ 2.
Let us now explain how to define interpretation 2(x1,x2) =⋆ (y1, y2) of binary
exponentiation function graph. We describe it as an algorithm that could be easily
transformed to a ∆pred0 -formula. In the case of x1 = x2 = 0 we define 2
(x1,x2) =⋆
(y1, y2) to be true if either y1 = 0 and y2 = S(0), or y1 = S(0) and y2 = 0. Otherwise,
we consider y0 = max(y1, y2). We find y0 ≥ z such that z = x1 + x2 (if there are
no z with this property then we put 2(x1,x2) =⋆ (y1, y2) to be false). We find z
′ ≤ z
such that S(z′) = z. And we find w ≤ y0 such that w = 2
z (if there are no w with
this property then we put 2(x1,x2) =⋆ (y1, y2) to be false). We put 2
(x1,x2) =⋆ (y1, y2)
to be true iff (w,w) =⋆ (y1, y2). in the case x1 + x2 ≥ 1 we use the fact that if
2x1+x2 = y1 + y2 then 2
x1+x2−1 ≤ max(y1, y2) and 2x1+x2−1 + 2x1+x2−1 = 2x1+x2 .
One could check that both EA and H verify that the interpretation SUM works as
intended, i.e. for any predicate symbol P (x1, . . . , xn) of predicate-only arithmetical
language and its SUM-interpretation P ⋆((x1,1, x1,2), . . . , (xn,1, xn,2)) we have
1.
EA ⊢ ∀
1≤i≤n, 0≤j≤2
xi,j(
∧
1≤i≤n
xi,1 + xi,2 = xi,0 →
(P (x1,0, . . . , xn,0)↔ P
⋆((x1,1, x1,2), . . . , (xn,1, xn,2)))),
2.
H ⊢ NAT ( ∀
1≤i≤n, 0≤j≤2
xi,j(
∧
1≤i≤n
xi,1 + xi,2 = xi,0 →
(P (x1,0, . . . , xn,0)↔ P
⋆((x1,1, x1,2), . . . , (xn,1, xn,2))))).
Recall that we consider a Πpred1 sentence ϕ such that EA ⊢ ϕ
2S . Since EA verifies
that the sums of pairs of numbers from S are precisely the numbers from 2S, we have
EA ⊢ (SUM(ϕ))S . And since the interpretation SUM interpretes all the predicate
symbols by ∆pred0 formulas, the translation SUM(ϕ) is a Π
pred
1 formula. Thus by
Lemma 5.2 we have H ⊢ NAT −n(SUM(ϕ)), for some n. Now let us reason in
H to prove ϕ. We consider two cases: 1. the number 2n does not exists, 2. the
number 2n exists. In the case 1. we exploit the fact that ϕ is a true Πpred1 fact and
just formalize in H the direct verification of the fact that ϕ holds when the range of
quantifiers is restricted to the numbers < 2n. In the case 2. we observe that any
natural number x ∈ Nat is equal to the sum x1 + x2 for some x1, x2 ∈ Nat
−n and
hence NAT −n(SUM(ϕ)) implies ϕ.
Note that with additional efforts, in Corollary 5.3 the cut 2S could be replaced
with the cut (1 + ε)S, for any fixed rational ε > 0.
An easy adaptation of Lemma 4.1 to the case of H shows that EA ⊢ (Conpred(H<ω))
2S .
And by Corollary 5.3 we conclude
Theorem 5.4. H proves NAT (Conpred(H<ω)).
A H<ω and Robinson’s Arithmetic R
In the section we present several observations about the connection between our theory
H<ω and Robinson’s arithmetic R. They were noticed by Albert Visser when he read
a draft of this paper.
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Robinson’s arithmetic R is a weak arithmetical theory introduced by Tarski,
Mostowski, and Robinson [14] and known to be hereditarily undecidable. As usual,
the numeral n is the term Sn(0). The axioms of Robinson’s arithmetic R are:
1. n+m = n+m;
2. n ·m = n ·m;
3. n 6= m, for n 6= m;
4. x ≤ n→
∨
i≤n
x = i;
5. x ≤ n ∨ n ≤ x.
Visser have showed that the interpretability class of the theory R is fairly special.
A theory is called locally finitely satisfiable if any its finite subtheories have a finite
model. The theory R is locally finitely satisfiable. And it were proved by Visser [16]
that any c.e. locally finitely satisfiable theory T is interpretable in R. In other words
the interpretability class of R is the greatest among interpretability classes of c.e.
locally finitely satisfiable theories.
Observe that theory H<ω is locally finitely satisfiable, thus it is interpretable in
R. On the other hand, using our development of ordinal arithmetic in H we could
interpret R in H<ω. The domain of the interpretation are finite ordinals. The constant
0 is interpreted by the empty set. For the purposes of the interpretation we make
the partial functions S,+, · total by assigning the value 0 to the inputs where partial
functions were undefined. Trivial check shows that the translations of all the axioms
of R are provable in H<ω.
Thus R and H<ω are mutually interpretable. And hence theory H<ω from inter-
pretability theoretic point of view could be regarded as the set-theoretic analogue of
R. However, unlike H<ω, to the best of the author’s knowledge, no analogue of the
self-verification property of H<ω is known for R. And due to the extreme weakness of
R, I do not expect that R proves its own consistency for any natural arithmetization
of its consistency assertion.
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